J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30

In this case there was a grazing agreement made in February 1983 that had come to an end at the end of that year. Graham, the defendant, had asked to renew the agreement, but the owners refused his request and asked him to vacate. Notwithstanding the requirement to vacate, Graham remained in occupation and eventually made no further attempt to obtain a new licence. In 1997 Graham, relying on section 15 of the Limitation Act 1990, claimed title to the land. In April 1998 Pye brought proceedings against the personal representatives of the now

However, it was only in 1999 that the owners brought possession proceedings.

There was no issue as to an implied licence to remain, on the contrary such an inference could hardly be asserted in the face of the owner's express refusals to renew the grazing agreement.

Pye lost the initial case, but succeeded in the Court of Appeal, which held that Graham did not at any material time have the necessary intention to dispossess Pye. Graham’s estate appealed to the House of Lords.

The appeal was allowed and Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that although the term 'adverse' is used in the Limitation Act 1980, it is used simply as a shorthand term to describe the nature of the possession. The true position is simply whether the paper owners are 'dispossessed' by virtue of the squatter going into ordinary possession of the land. There is no requirement for the legal owner to be ousted from the land.

Brown-Wilkinson confirmed that 'possession' constitutes two elements; factual possession and intention to possess. The facts clearly demonstrated the appropriate degree of physical control by Graham. Pye was physically excluded from the land by the hedges which surrounded it (at all material times tended by Graham) and the lack of any key to the road gate (held at all material times by Mrs Graham). Regarding the intention to possess, the Lords held that this could be inferred where land was occupied and made full use of by the squatter in the way in which an owner would. There did not have to be an intention to own the land, merely to possess. Nor was requisite intention displaced where, as with Graham, the squatter would, if asked, have been willing to pay for his occupation.

The case makes it clear that, in order to succeed in a claim to adverse possession, the occupier must prove:

(a) uninterrupted possession of the land; and
(b) an intention to possess.

Possession requires a sufficient degree of physical custody and control. The occupiers, the Grahams, had been farming the land without consent for 15 years. It did not matter that they had not 'physically excluded' Pye from the land. There was no requirement to 'oust' the Grahams from the land. The activities carried on by the Grahams thus amounted to 'possession'.

An intention to possess is an intention to exercise that custody and control on behalf of oneself and for one's own benefit - the Grahams had that intention.

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