Discuss the role of the common law in the protection of our environment. Is there a need for strict liability for pollution incidents within the common law
The intention of this study is to constructively and critically analyse the role of the common law in the protection of our environment. The discussion that will follow will attempt to constructively analyse the pros and cons of the role of the common law in the protection of our environment. The discussion will attempt to find out whether or not the common law has done enough to protect our environment. This study will analyse the remedies which are available under the common law. There will also be a critical analysis of the actions that an aggrieved plaintiff may bring under the common law. This study will also constructively and critically analyse whether or not there should be strict liability for pollution incidents within the common law.
This study also intends to conduct a critical analysis of the rules laid down by the courts which play a part in the legal working and the governing of environmental law. Some of these rules have been altered, disagreed with and had adverse comment made about them. This study will analyse such comments with reference to the relevant case law. This study will also critically analyse the advantages and the disadvantages of the role of the common law in and its approach to the protection of our environment.
To begin this study it is important to ascertain the point made by Wolf & White that the development of environmental law owes a great deal to the common law, in particular to the torts of public and private nuisance, negligence, trespass and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher . Wolf and White go on to state that the application of these torts on the field of environmental protection developed significantly in the late 19th century. They state that the common law has provided the basis for the development of environmental legislation which has to an extent modified and supplemented the common law principles to establish a more rigid framework which is better suited to the protection of the environment.
Wolf and White hold the view that the current legal framework for environmental protection is largely made up of statutory provisions but, however, the common law is still recognised as having a valid place within this legal framework. They also hold the view that even though the reliance on the torts of nuisance, negligence, trespass and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has diminished as more specific and direct environmental law has been enacted, the common law is still recognised as having a legitimate role in protecting the environment.
Before considering the purposes of the common law within the framework of environmental law it is very important that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher be fully analysed and discussed. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is cited by Hepple and Matthews and is as follows. The rule came about as a result of the case itself. The facts of the case are that an appeal was made from a decision of the Court of Exchequer by the defendant in an action brought against them by the plaintiff for damage done to his mines through the escape of water from a reservoir on the defendants’ land.
Hepple and Matthews cite the facts of the case as follows. The plaintiff was a tenant of Lord Wilton. The defendants, who were proprietors of a mill, made upon land of Lord Wilton’s, in pursuance of an arrangement made with him for that purpose, a reservoir employing competent persons to construct the same. It turned out that beneath the site of the reservoir were old shafts running down into coal workings long disused which communicated with other old workings situated under the land of one Whitehead. The plaintiff’s colliery adjoined Whitehead’s land and the plaintiff soon after he had commenced working the colliery, made arrangements with Whitehead to get, by means of the pit, the coal lying under Whitehead’s land. In pursuance of those arrangements the plaintiff had worked through from the colliery to the coal lying under Whitehead’s land. As a result of the workings of the plaintiff’s colliery were made to communicate with the old workings under the reservoir. These under ground works were effected several years before the defendant’s commenced making their reservoir but the fact of their existence was not known to the defendants or any agent of theirs, or any person employed by them, until the reservoir burst. In the course of constructing the reservoir the shafts were perceived but it was not known nor suspected that they had been made for the purpose of getting coal beneath the site of the reservoir. The Special Case stated that in the action contained a finding that there was no personal negligence or default on the part of the defendants themselves in relation to the selection of the site or the construction of the reservoir, but reasonable and proper care was not used by the persons employed with reference to the shafts so met with to provide for the sufficiency of the reservoir to bear the pressure which, when filled, it would have to bear. The reservoir in consequence burst downwards into the shafts and the water found its way into the plaintiff’s mine. The majority of the Court of Exchequer held that the non-exercise of sufficient care upon the part of the persons employed to construct the reservoir did not, in the absence of any notice to the defendants of the underground communication, affect the defendants with any liability, there being in the absence of such notice no duty cast upon the defendants to use any particular amount of care in the construction of a reservoir upon their own land. Bramwell B was of opinion that the question of knowledge was immaterial and that the defendants were, therefore, liable. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Exchequer.
On allowing the appeal in the Exchequer Chamber Blackburn J stated:
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it
at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape.”
Jones states that this statement has come to be known as the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The House of Lords approved Blackburn J’s judgement but Lord Cairns added that the defendant’s use of land was ‘non-natural’. In subsequent cases, as will be seen later in this study, the requirement of non-natural use was established as part of the rule. Jones does point out that this did limit the scope for development of this form of strict liability because Blackburn J had referred to a person bringing onto his property something ‘which was not naturally there’. Jones is of the view that this is clearly a wider test than non-natural use in that something may be brought on to land to be used in a natural or ordinary manner even though it was ‘not naturally there’.
Consideration and careful analysis must be given to the purpose which the common law serves to the legal framework surrounding environmental law. According to Wolf and White the purpose and the essential function of the common law is to protect interests in land. They state that the fact that it has developed to prevent or rectify any damage of an environmental nature is really an indirect consequence of this primary objective. They state that as a direct result of this the use of the common law in this area has diminished in recent years because more reliance has been place on legislative provisions even though it is still being used in a number of cases. The common law will be used in cases where there is no statutory remedy available or by individuals and pressure common law was used because there was no statutory remedy available was the case of Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather plc . This has made a considerable impact on the interpretation and application of the common law to environmental problems.
The facts of the case are that in September 1976 the Cambridge Water Company bought a piece of land which was formerly used as a paper mill attached to which was a licence to abstract water from a borehole on the site. The Water Company began to abstract the water in 1979. Unknown to the Water Company was the fact that the water was contaminated by a solvent which had leached into the aquifer from a nearby tannery operated by Eastern Counties Leather. These spillages had occurred regularly between 1950 and 1976 after which the tannery began to operate more efficiently. The contamination was not considered an issue until the EC Directive 80/778 relating to drinking water standards for human consumption was issued. It contained figures relating to the maximum levels of perchloroethylene which could be present in the water. The water abstracted from the borehole from Eastern Counties Leather was found to exceed these limits and use of the borehole was ceased.
The High Court dismissed the action in nuisance and negligence as it decided that the pollution caused by the defendant’s activities could not have been foreseen. Appeal was made to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed the original judgement and awarded the plaintiffs £1 million in damages plus costs. The Court of Appeal made no comment regards the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as it thought it ‘inapposite in the present case’. The Court of Appeal decision sent out a warning to polluters and did provided some solace in that redress for pollution could be sought. An appeal was made to the House of Lords.
Jones states that the House of Lords held that it was an essential element in an action to recover damages in the tort of nuisance under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher that harm of the relevant type was foreseeable by the defendant. Lord Goff said that the general tenor Blackburn J’s judgement was that knowledge or at least foreseeability of the risk is a prerequisite of the recovery of damages under the rule although the rule is one of strict liability in the sense that the defendant may be held liable notwithstanding that he has exercised all due care to prevent the escape from occurring. Since the contamination of the plaintiff’s water supply was not foreseeable at the time of the spillages the defendants were not liable. The link between nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher was expressly endorsed by Lord Goff who stated :
“it would moreover lead to a more coherent body of common law principles if the rule
were to be regarded essentially as an extension of the law of nuisance to cases of
isolated escapes from land, even though the rule as established is not limited to escapes
which are in fact isolated.”
Bell and McGillivray hold the view that certain features of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher were not directly addressed in the Cambridge Water case. They state that unlike nuisance it would appear that the claimant does not need to have an interest in land to invoke the rule. They hold the view that it is probable that Lord Goff’s insistence in the Cambridge Water case that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is really just a part of nuisance law, combined with the decision of the House of Lords in Hunter v. Canary Wharf restricting the right to sue in nuisance cases to proprietors, is similarly to restrict the right to sue following incidences of one-off escapes. Bell and McGillivray have the opinion that the Cambridge Water case probably also now means that Rylands v. Fletcher can no longer be used to claim personal injury loses. They do state that what is clear is that the balancing act between relaxing non-natural use and now stipulating the reasonable foreseeability of the damage allows the courts to continue to pay attention to the costs of preventing damage arising. Wolf and White hold the view that the judgement has been viewed by environmentalists as being restrictive because of the affirmation of the requirement of foreseeability in nuisance and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They state that critics of the judgement say that only very rarely will it impose liability for pollution cases like the Cambridge Water case.
Wolf and White are of the view that even though there has been a decline in the importance which has been attached to the common law it is still seen as being the area which gives rise to the most liability by banks, lending institutions, landowners and developers. They go on to state that such institutions are taking their lead from the United States where litigation on environmental issues is extremely common. They are of the view that the major problem for business in relation to the common law is the uncertainty of the outcome of the case as often there are no precedents for the extent of the damages which can be awarded against the polluter is unknown.
As stated in the introduction to this study, the remedies which are readily available and offered by the common law within environmental law are now to be critically analysed. The analysis will take in what the remedies are and whether or not they go far enough in compensating the plaintiff or in ordering the defendant to either carry out or do something or to stop doing something. Wolf and White state that the common law offers a number of remedies which can be sought by the plaintiff to an action but the type of remedy sought does very much so depend on the circumstances of each case. There are three remedies offered by the common law, namely damages, injunction and abatement.
The first remedy that is available is damages and the aim of this remedy is to put the plaintiff in the position that he would have been in had the harm or damage not happened. Wolf and White state that the problem with damages is that it is particularly difficult to calculate in relation to environmental damage because it is often the case that environmental damage can never be calculated for a number of years as the clean up may take several years or the damage that has been done may never be fully rectified. In this case, the most common form of damages that the courts award are compensatory damages. This has the aim of compensating the plaintiff for any loss that has been suffered.
Wolf and White also point out that there are several other forms of damages that may be awarded by the courts and that these awards are not uncommon in actions which concern the environment and environmental issues. The first such award is aggravated damages. This may be awarded by the court where the court has the desire to denounce the defendant’s actions by way of compensating a plaintiff who has suffered more damage than is normally expected.
The second such award is punitive or exemplary damages. The explanation given by Wolf and White is that the court makes such an award in order to punish the tortfeasor by adding an extra compensatory award to the compensatory damages awarded. The desired effect of this is to have the effect of a deterrent in that it will deter other people from committing the same offence. The awarding of exemplary damages is governed by the rule in Rookes v. Barnard . In this case it was held that damages of this type could only be awarded in three strict classes of cases, the first of which being where servants of the government act in an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional manner. The second class covers situations where the defendant’s conduct could be seen to be a deliberate way in which to calculate a profit from the tort itself. Wolf and White hold the view that this is particularly appropriate in environmental cases because industrial operators feel it would be more profitable continue with the polluting activity and to face the consequences when paying damages rather than to cease production or to operate with less polluting techniques. The third class of cases is where the statute expressly permits the payments of exemplary damages.
Another remedy that is offered by the common law as being in addition to or as an alternative damages is that the plaintiff may seek bring an injunction against an offending defendant. An injunction will allow the court to place a requirement on the defendant that it immediately cease and discontinue the operation which is considered to be causing environmental damage. There are two different types of injunction available namely mandatory and prohibitory. A mandatory injunction will be awarded by the court where it will require the defendant to cease or undo the wrongful act. On the other hand, a prohibitory injunction may be awarded by the court where it will order the tortfeasor not to commit a wrongful act. Bell and McGillivray state that the awarding of an injunction is a discretionary remedy that can either prohibit or restrict a defendant from carrying on an environmentally damaging activity. They state that the either activity complained of has to be continuing at the date of claim or that has to be a threat that the activity will continue. Even where the activity has ceased at by the time of trial an injunction can still be sought if it existed when the claim was brought. Bell and McGillivray point out that even though injunctions are discretionary the general principle in the two torts where continuing damage is likely is that the claimants can expect to obtain an injunction unless the activity complained of is not of sufficient gravity or duration to justify stopping the defendant’s actions. Wolf and White point out that a plaintiff may apply for an interim or an interlocutory injunction which would have the effect of preventing the offending action being continued pending the arrangement of a full hearing.
Wolf and White hold the view that the effects of an injunction can be quite damaging for those on whom it is imposed. They state that the effects of such an injunction are quite detrimental to a business and may deter further polluting operations by the same firm or by others fearing similar results. Wolf and White present the argument that an injunction can act as a much greater deterrent than a prosecution under statute where the fines have considerably less impact than the financial and commercial damage that can be caused by the closure or the restriction of the operation.
It is important to note that the courts have at their disposal the discretion to make an award of damages and to order an injunction should they feel it to be an absolute necessity.
The third and final remedy that is offered by the common law is that of abatement. Wolf and White state that the remedy of abatement dates back many years although it is rarely used today as its use is not encouraged by the courts. It has, however, developed under statute and is the main remedy for statutory nuisance. Under the common law, abatement is known as the self help remedy because an occupier of land affected may take action to abate the damage. Of the remedy of abatement Bell and McGillivray hold the view that the remedy of abatement tends to be more of historic interest than practical use. The remedy involves the removal of a nuisance by the injured party without recourse to legal proceedings. They state that the courts view this remedy unfavourably and it now appears to be confined to simple cases where resort to legal proceedings would be inappropriate or where urgent action is evidently needed.
It is at this point that the common law actions that are available in environmental law. The actions that are going to be considered are nuisance in general, public and private nuisance separately and negligence.
Wolf and White state that actions in nuisance can be categorised into private nuisance, public nuisance and statutory nuisance as provided for by the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and supplemented by the provisions of the Noise and Statutory Nuisance Act 1993. They state that it is vitally important that there is distinction drawn between the different types of nuisance because each type of nuisance is significantly different from the others. Private nuisance makes an attempt to reconcile the competing interests of landowners. Public nuisance is a crime which protects public rights even though an individual may bring an action where he has suffered damage over and above that suffered by the public generally. Finally, a statutory nuisance is a nuisance which is largely controlled by local authorities exercising their statutory powers.
Wolf and White state that the tort of nuisance is recognised today as being the are of the common law which has made the most significant contribution to environmental protection. They hold the view that it is the area of tort which is most commonly relied upon in cases concerning damage to the environment. It is at this point that private and public nuisance must both be analysed.
Bell and McGillivray define private nuisance as being concerned with the unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or of some right over or in connection with it. At this point it must be clearly stressed that not every interference with another’s use or enjoyment of land can constitute a private nuisance. Wolf and White state that for a private nuisance action to be actionable, the conduct complained of must constitute an unreasonable interference with an occupier’s interest in the beneficial use of his land.
Private nuisance was defined in Read v. Lyons & Co Ltd as ‘unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or some right over, or in connection with. It is also very important that in an action based on nuisance the court must judge whether or not the defendant is using his property reasonably. The importance of this requirement of the tort of nuisance was stated by Buckley J in Saunders Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions and D’Allesandri when he said:
“…. the court must consider whether the defendant is using his property reasonably
or not. If he is using it reasonably, there is nothing which at law can be considered
a nuisance: but if he is not using it reasonably …. Then the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.”
Bell and McGillivray hold the opinion that in attempting to assess liability in a nuisance claim, a balance is made between the reasonableness of the defendant’s activity and its impact upon the claimant’s proprietary rights.
Wolf and White state that this statement must be qualified by the fact that in coming to a decision as to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct the following factors will be taken into account: locality, duration, sensitivity of the plaintiff, intention of the plaintiff, and the utility of the defendant’s conduct. Each of these factors will now be examined in turn.
Of the above heads, locality will be discussed first. Wolf and White state that there is actionable nuisance under the locality principle where the injury consists of interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. They go on to state that the locality doctrine can be traced back to the decision in St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping however the question of locality was raised by Thesiger LJ in Sturges v. Bridgman . In this case, Thesiger LJ stated:
“What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in
Bermondsey.”
In Gillingham BC v. CV Medway (Chatham) Dock the question of locality was raised once again. The case itself questioned the effects of granting planning permission on the nature of the locality. Wolf and White state that judgement in this case made the suggestion that the granting of planning permission could change the character of the locality. Wolf and White further reserve the opinion that the judgement in this particular case was not conclusive as regards questions that were raised but not entirely answered. Wolf and White note one particular question that was not answered: to what extent could conditions be introduced to regulate antisocial activities. This issue was more recently addressed in Wheeler and Another v. J J Saunders Ltd and Others . This case concerned the granting of planning permission for two pig rearing houses. The plaintiffs brought a successful action in private nuisance which came as a result of the smells emanating from the pig houses. The Court of Appeal did accept that the granting of planning permission might change the character of a neighbourhood but the proposition that a planning permission automatically authorised any nuisance that could arise as a result of it was rejected by Staughton LJ.
It is important to note that the judgements in these two cases will have the effect of warning future developers to ensure that their operations do not create a nuisance which would constitute interference with the rights of private citizens.
The next factor to be considered here is the duration and the intensity of the nuisance. Bell and McGillivray state that not every interference with property will actionable in nuisance. They state that there must be some appreciable harm and that this rule applies more generally to all nuisance claims. The courts will look to the duration and intensity of the activity complained of. For a nuisance to be actionable it must be something which is more than temporary. Wolf and White point out that there are exceptions where the application of this rule could be deemed to be unreasonable. The case of De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd. v. Spicer Bros Ltd is one such example. This case was brought on the grounds that the defendant’s building operations were so loud that guests at the hotel were unable to sleep and after dinner speakers were unable to make themselves heard. It was held that the defendants were not carrying out the operations in a reasonable and proper manner.
Another factor requiring consideration is the sensitivity of the plaintiff. Bell and McGillivray have the view that the test for assessing nuisance has two elements. They state that not only must the use of land which is complained of be unreasonable, but also the use of the land to which the nuisance applies must be a reasonable use. They hold the view that if a potential claimant is particularly sensitive to one type of nuisance then it will not be actionable unless that nuisance would have affected a reasonable person. An explanation of this was given in Robinson v. Kilvert . In this case the plaintiff claimed that the heat from the defendant’s property, which was situated in the basement, was having an adverse effect on the brown paper stored at his premises. It was held that there no actionable nuisance because:
“a man who carries on an exceptionally delicate trade cannot complain because it is
injured by his neighbour doing something which would not injure anything but an
exceptionally delicate trade.”
In their appraisal of this decision, Bell and McGillivray of the opinion that the effect of the rule laid down in that case is not as wide as first imagined. They state that the principle only applies when the unreasonableness of the conduct is specifically the result of the hypersensitivity of the claimant. Wolf and White are of the opinion that the rationale behind this principle is consistent with the law nuisance in that each owner of property should have a right to reasonably use and enjoy his land.
The final two factors for consideration are the intention of the defendant and the utility of the defendant’s conduct. Wolf and White state that the defendant’s motives may be some indication of the reasonableness of his conduct. If the defendant’s actions are motivated by malice they will be deemed to be unreasonable . Regarding the utility of the defendant’s conduct, Wolf and White state that if the defendant is carrying out operations which provide a general benefit to the whole community, then the nuisance will be more reasonable or justifiable than if his motive is purely selfish or malicious.
Before concluding the debate on private nuisance it is important to point out that anybody with an interest in land affected may bring an action. This may include the occupier, a tenant in possession and anybody else with a legal interest in land.
As private nuisance has been discussed, it is important that the position regards to public nuisance be thoroughly analysed. Bell and McGillivray view public nuisance as being a close relative of private nuisance. They state that the law surrounding public nuisances contains similar elements but has many distinguishing features. They state that public nuisance is primarily a crime involving nuisance affecting a section of the general public although the law developed over time so that anyone suffering special damage beyond that suffered by the public generally has a claim in tort. Public nuisance was defined in Attorney-General v. PYA Quarries :
“a public nuisance is one which materially affects the reasonable comfort and
convenience of a life of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects who come within the sphere
or neighbourhood of its operation; the question whether the number of persons affected
is sufficient to constitute a class is one of fact in every case and it is sufficient to show
that a representative cross-section of that class has been so affected for an injunction
to issue.”
This case clearly demonstrates the width of the class of persons that must be affected. Denning LJ attempted to lay down guidelines but declined to state what numbers would be required to show that a particular nuisance was public rather than private. Denning LJ stated:
“I prefer to look to the reason of the thing and to say that a public nuisance is a nuisance
which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be
reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings … to put a stop to it, but it should
take on the responsibility of the community at large.”
Bell and McGillvray conclude that if the need to show an effect over a section of the public is set aside there is a good degree of overlap with factors that are taken into account when deciding whether or not there is a private nuisance.
A public nuisance is a crime and therefore the Attorney-General or any local authority may seek an injunction. However, a claim may be taken with the Attorney-General by an affected individual.
There are two other actions that the common law offers. These actions are negligence and trespass. Each of these two actions will now be addressed separately.
Wolf and White state that negligence is rarely used in actions relating to environmental protection despite its wide application across numerous areas of dispute. They have the view that there a number of disadvantages with negligence which limit the availability of this action in environmental cases. The disadvantages are that the courts have shown great reluctance in awarding compensation for pure economic loss therefore making it essential that the case be based on damage or personal injury. The evidential burden is also very great. There are a number of advantages to this action in that there is no need to prove an interest in the land which is affected and there is no requirement to demonstrate loss by other members of the public.
Wolf and White also comment on trespass stating that its application for environmental purposes is a more recent development and that its use appears to be very limited. They go on to state that there is some overlap between trespass to land and private nuisance although it may be easier to bring an action on the basis of trespass because there is no requirement to prove actual damage as there is with nuisance.
The final part of this study will attempt to give a full analysis and evaluation of what are seen to be the many advantages and disadvantages of the common law as a means of environmental protection. Wolf and White see the first fundamental problem with the common law is that it cannot prevent damage to the environment. The common law compensates the landowner affected instead. They hold the view that because the development of the common law control has taken place over a number of years and at a time when the environment was not highly regarded it does not meet the specific needs of environmental protection in that it operates on the basis of cure rather than prevention and it creates an uncertain level of liability. It only allows individuals to be guardians of the environment on an ad-hoc basis.
The common law also carries evidential difficulties in that it can be very difficult to establish the source of the pollution and further establish a causal link between the pollution and the damage caused. This caused by the fact that pollution can occur in many ways. The incident might only be isolated or it may result from a number of incidents occurring over a period of time.
Another disadvantage of the common law is that the cost of financing such an action can often be prohibitive especially now as legal aid is restricted in such cases. This means that only the very wealthy can take such an action. The financial problems are not helped by the fact that an unsuccessful plaintiff has to bear all the costs of the case.
The final disadvantage noted is that the requirement of foreseeability as being a requirement for recovery in nuisance. This was introduced by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather plc .
Wolf and White note that another limitation to the effectiveness of the common law’s protection of the environment is the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 .
Despite its many disadvantages, the common law protection of the environment does have a number of advantages. The advantages of the common law are that it can be extremely helpful and useful where there is no statutory provision. The common law can also be readily relied upon where the pollution complained of outdates the statute. Pressure groups and individuals have often tested the common law and have often met with success. Finally common law actions can be based on more than one ground. This can augment the chances of a successful action greatly.
In concluding this study it would appear that common law does play a vital role in the protection of our environment. Unfortunately, the role of the common law is being restricted by the limitations that have been placed on it by statute . On the issue of whether or not there is a need for strict liability for pollution incidents within the common law, this commentator is of the opinion that if someone is knowingly polluting and continuing to pollute the environment with the knowledge that this is happening should be made strictly liable for their actions. Ignorance will be no defence in this instance. The polluter should also be made strictly liable for the clean-up of the pollution and the restoration of the environment to it previous and best state. This commentator agrees with the judgement in the Cambridge Water case that it should be a reasonable foreseeablity that the pollution will cause loss and damage. This commentator also agrees with this judgement to the extent that it is the function of parliament and not the common law to create a statutory regime of liability for environmental damage. This commentator harbours the opinion that a radical strengthening of the statutory framework for controlling environmental pollution and damage will greatly diminish the reliance that is placed on the common law.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Environmental Law, 5th Edition by Stuart Bell and Donald McGillivray. Published by
Blackstone Press Limited in 2000.
2. Environmental Law, 1st Edition by Susan Wolf and Anna White. Published by Cavendish Publishing Limited in 1995.
3. Environmental Law – A Practical Handbook by John Garbutt. Published by Chancery
Law Publishing in 1992.
4. Environmental Law, Second Edition by David Hughes. Published by Butterworths in
1992.
4. Textbook on Torts, 5th Edition by Michael A. Jones. Published by Blackstone Press
Limited in 1996.
5. Tort: Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition by B.A. Hepple and M. H. Matthews.
Published by Butterworths in 1991.
6. Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 15th Edition by W.V.H. Rogers. Published by Sweet &
Maxwell in 1998.
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