In child care law and practice, does the Human Rights Act 1998 provide a framework in which the (at times conflicting)interests of the child and his/her parents are protected?
Introduction
Child care and law has always struggled to balance the interests of children and their parents. Over the last few decades, the approach has been to regard the interests of children as paramount. This principle, which is commonly referred to by practitioners as the ‘paramountcy’ or ‘best interests principle’ is embodied in section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 (CA) which provides as follows:
When a court determines any question with respect to
(a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it,
the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.
The paramountcy principle has been a feature of English law for a very long time (Alston & Gilmour-Walsh 1996, p3) and from time to time, has been subjected to critical scrutiny (Reece 1996, p 267; Fineman 1988, p727. However, the principle has come under even more scrutiny due to the recent passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which domesticated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR or Convention) since the Convention purports to promote and protect the interests of both parents as well as their children. This essay steps into the discourse relating to the balance between children’s interests and those of their parents by investigating whether the HRA provides a framework for the mediation of parents and children’s interests should those come into conflict. In order to clarify the sometimes antagonistic relationship between children’s rights and parents rights, I briefly analyse the implications of the paramountcy principle and then I offer a brief foray into the rights-based approach under the ECHR. In the penultimate section, I examine whether the HRA provides a framework for mediating disjoints between children’s and parents’ interests. I make my final observations in the conclusion.
Implications of the welfare principle
The welfare principle set out in section 1(1) of the CA has already been quoted. This section requires that the interests of the child are treated as paramount and so the interests of parents or other parties must be subordinated to those of the child. As Lord McDermott in the House of Lords explained, the welfare principle, ‘connote[s] a process whereby when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’s welfare’(Re KD (A Minor) (Wardship: Termination Of Access) [1970] AC 668 at pp710-711).Similarly, the Court of Appeal stated in Re P (Contact: Supervision) ([1996] 2 FLR 314 at p328) that the court is concerned with the interests of the mother and the father only in so far as they bear on the welfare of the child’. This view has been upheld in a dearth of other cases by the courts (Lowe 1997).
Thus, the law’s rendering of the paramountcy principle is essentially individualistic. In other words, the welfare of the child is viewed without consideration for the welfare or interests of the rest of his or her family, friends and community.
Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation)([1997] 2 WLR 556) provides a good example of how the individualistic conception of the welfare principle works in actual practice. This case involved a mentally handicapped adult; however it is still relevant because the test that was applied is the same paramountcy principle used in relation to children. In Re Y permission was sought and granted to remove bone marrow from Y to give to her sister. Connell J stated that the ‘root question’ was ‘whether the procedures will benefit [Y] and accordingly any benefits which may flow to [Y’s sister] are relevant only in so far as they have a positive effect upon the best interests of [Y]’. He authorised the operation stating that it would be in Y’s interests because the bone marrow might save the sister’s life and this would prolong the life of the mother who was very close to Y. There were concerns that, were the sister to die, the mother’s life-expectancy would diminish and this would be contrary to Y’s best interests. The fact that Y’s sister’s life was in danger was, therefore, irrelevant except to the extent that her death might affect Y’s welfare.
The paramountcy principle was further affirmed by Lord Oliver in Re K D (Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) ([1988] 2 WLR 398). He specifically considered the mother’s appeal that the right to access was a parental right protected by article 8 of the ECHR and that to terminate access with her child would result in a breach of her article 8 rights. In deciding the matter, Lord Oliver held:
Parenthood [confers]...on parents the exclusive privilege of ordering...the upbringing of children of tender age ... That is a privilege which ... is circumscribed by many limitations ... When the jurisdiction of the court is invoked for the protection of the child the parental privileges do not terminate. They do, however, become immediately subservient to the paramount consideration ... the welfare of the child.
Thus, the approach of domestic courts is clear: the welfare of the child is paramount. In other words, the outcome which was evidentially proven to promote that welfare would prevail, notwithstanding the strength of the interests of any other party including parents. This point was graphically illustrated by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in considering the inter-relationship between the welfare principle and the court’s power to order contact under section 8 of the CA in Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions)
It [is]...worth stating...some very familiar but none the less fundamental principles...overriding all else...the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration ... it cannot be emphasised too strongly that the court is concerned with the interests of the mother and the father only in so far as they bear on the welfare of the child.
The principle is not only applied by the courts in disputes relating to children, but also has a considerable influence upon all other parties concerned with any application relating to children (Choudhry & Fenwick 2005, p453). The paramountcy principle has thus successfully embedded itself in the very core of the legal and multidisciplinary aspects of the upbringing of children. It is clear from the foregoing that the paramountcy is a very strong weapon in the armoury of child protection and its meaning and scope of the paramountcy principle is well understood amongst family law practitioners: in decisions concerning children, the welfare of the child is to be the single deciding factor, that is, paramount over, and in fact displacing, all other considerations. Consequently, the paramountcy principle has been criticised on the grounds that that it prevents proper consideration being paid to the interests of participants other than the child and who play a very critical role in his or her upbringing. In her critical examination of the principle, Reece (1996) has concluded that:
[t]he paramountcy principle must be abandoned, and replaced with a framework which recognises that the child is merely one participant in a process in which the interests of all the participants count.
Reece’s concerns seem to focus largely around the way legal conceptions of welfare smuggled into the adjudication process values that undermined the rights of adults. In this regard, she proffers the example of decisions denying residence rights to homosexuals. The susceptibility of the welfare principle to ideological or even religious posturing of decision-makers inputs has long been recognised (Alston 1994a), and Reece argues that this has the effect of covertly subjecting the interests of adults to those of children (Herring 1999a).
However, the most potent criticism against the paramountcy principle is that it does not sit well with ECHR. In particular, it has been suggested that the principle goes against article 8 of the Convention which provides a qualified right to respect for private and family life, the home and correspondence. By encapsulating the rights of both parents and children to private and family life, article 8 appears on its face to come into clear conflict with the CA, which renders the child’s interests paramount. This criticism has become particularly compelling since the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which domesticated Convention rights in the UK (Herring 1999b).
The issue of the suggested tension between the paramountcy principle and the Convention had been confronted earlier. In Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access)( [1988] 2 WLR 398) the House of Lords considered whether the application of the principle was consistent with proper recognition of a parental ‘right’ to contact which was acknowledged under article 8 (R v UK; W v UK; B v UK). In Re KD, Lord Oliver thought there was no conflict:
Such conflict as exists is, I think, semantic only and lies only in differing ways of giving expression to the single common concept that the natural bond and relationship between parent and child gives rise to universally recognised norms which ought not to be gratuitously interfered with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the welfare of the child dictates it.
Many commentators, however, were still not convinced by this judicial pronouncement. They pointed out that the paramountcy principle in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 was couched in the following manner (section 1):
[the court] shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration and shall not take into consideration whether from any other point of view the claim of the father, or any right at common law possessed by the father, in respect of such custody ... is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father.
Clearly, the provision expressly requires the court not to give any independent weight to the ‘claims’ or ‘rights’ of either parent against one another. Since parents were the only contestants envisaged, this effectively removed the place of ‘rights claims’ from the adjudication, which, became simply one of fact: what serves the child’s interests best? (A V C [1985] FLR 445, at p455). This rendering of the paramountcy principle was sustained by section 1(1) of the CA. Thus, it certainly does appear that the paramountcy principle, in its orthodox form, can hardly be reconciled with due recognition of the rights of others as suggested by Lord Oliver.
Since, the above arguments imply that the approach under the ECHR is essentially different from that under the CA, it becomes critical to interrogate the framework protecting the interests of parents and under the instrument.
The approach under the ECHR and the HRA
It is necessary now to consider the ways in which the ECHR balances protects the welfare of children with the rights of adults. In this regard, it is generally argued that the Convention does not provide adequately for the rights of children (Bainham, 2005, pp 78-84; Fortin, 2003, pp 50-66. It was clearly drawn up with adults rather than children as the focus of attention (Douglas, 1988); and this is understandable, given the historical context in which it was promulgated. Indeed there are no provisions in the Convention explicitly dealing with children. However, that is not to say that children receive no protection under the Convention. The two most quoted articles in cases concerning children are article 8:
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
and article 2 of the first protocol,
‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
There are various ways in which a child's welfare is promoted under the European Convention on Human Rights (Smith, 1993). Firstly, children are entitled to the same rights under the Convention as adults. Article 1 states:
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms in this Convention'. Article 14 states that the rights must be granted without discrimination 'on any ground such as sex, race, colour ...
Although age is not specifically mentioned, the use of the words ‘such as’ indicates the list is not intended to be exhaustive and so it could be argued that age should be included as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Indeed the European Court has accepted that children are entitled to the rights listed in the Convention. (Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175, p 191) As an illustration, children have been able to bring applications before the European Court of Human Rights claiming that they are entitled to state protection under article 3 (when subject to corporal punishment)( A v United Kingdom (Human Rights: Punishment of Child) [1998] 2 FLR 959)and article 5 (to complain of being wrongfully detained in a hospital) (Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175).
However, although children are in theory entitled to claim these rights, one commentator has complained of the ‘pitifully inadequate response thus far by the European Institutions to the equally independent rights of children under the Convention’(Bainham, 1995, p 258). This complaint is made because often the rights of the children concerned are not explicitly mentioned by the courts when cases are brought by adults, even though the case concerns children. It is notable that most of the cases which have concerned children have involved parents bringing proceedings in respect of a breach of a parent’s rights. For example, the leading cases on the corporal punishment of children in schools concerned claims by parents that hitting children infringes the rights of parents (Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293).
Secondly, the European Court has been able to give weight to the interests of the child by considering the wording in the articles which restrict rights. Most notably there is a limitation in paragraph 2 of article 8 that interference with family life may be permitted by a public authority if it is ‘in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
Thus, a permitted interference of a right must be in accordance with the law; it must pursue a legitimate aim; it must be proportionate;and necessary. It is clearly established that a ‘legitimate aim’ includes preserving the rights and welfare of children (R v United Kingdom [1988] 2 FLR 445). The European Court on several occasions has stated that regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole (Kroon v Netherlands (1994) 17 EHRR 263, Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342). However, as yet, the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights have not developed a clear approach as to how to balance the rights and interests of parents and children. The Nielsen decision reinforces the view that the ECHR is not well equipped to help courts find an appropriate balance between parents’ rights and children’s rights. This view is borne out by the European Commission’s inconsistent approach in interpreting article 8 in cases involving children challenging their parents’ rights to force them to live at home. The Commission has had an obvious difficulty in protecting the child’s own right to family privacy alongside that of his or her parents. (Compare X v Netherlands (1974) Application 6753/74 1-3 D&R 118 and X v Denmark (1978) Application 6854/78 7-9 D&R 81. In fact, the approach of the Strasbourg institutions is exemplified in L v Sweden (Application 10141/82 40 D&R 140) (a case concerning contact with children in care) where the Commission stated:
The issue in these cases is not only what is the best solution for the child. Under Art 8, an interference with the right of the parents to continue to take care of their child cannot be justified simply on the basis that it would be better for the child to be taken care of by certain foster parents. In order to justify such an interference it is necessary under the terms of Article 8 that the State demonstrates sufficient reasons for the decision to take a child into care. The reasons should be of such a weight as to render the decision ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
This implies that the welfare of children is not necessarily paramount and that a child’s interests must be significantly weighty if they are to justify breach of an adult’s rights. Recently, however, the European Court has suggested that the issue is one for the national courts, and that the European Convention would only be relevant if a clearly inappropriate balance was drawn. So in Olsson v Sweden (No 2)((1994) 17 EHRR 134) it was held that:
[T]he interests as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be taken into account, notably the children's interests and their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Where contacts with the natural parents would harm those interests or interfere with these rights, it is for the national authorities to strike a fair balance.
It is clear, therefore that under the ECHR and as a consequence, under the HRA, the welfare of the child is not paramount and that a child’s interests must be sufficiently weighty if they are to override a parent’s rights. This means that despite making some provision for children’s rights, there is still potential for conflict between the interest of children and those adults under the HRA framework. The question, then, is: can such conflict be mediated? In the following section, I proffer an analysis which answers that question. I begin first by outlining the justification for mediation and then I spell out the likely framework for such mediation.
Mediating parents’ and children’s interests under the HRA
Justification for mediation
There is a strong consensus among family law practitioners that section 1(1) of the CA, as it is currently interpreted, reflects a predominantly utilitarian or welfarist approach. Stephen Parker in his seminal piece on family law and legal theory has analysed the movement of family law from a rights-based to a welfare-based approach (Parker 1992, p 311). Such contrasts between welfare and rights-based approaches have often been employed to illustrate the differences between the CA and the ECHR in terms of their underlying principles. In this regard, it is emphasised that before the HRA was enacted the rights-based model of family law had, it will be argued, been rejected due to the increasing dominance of the child-centred approach advocated by the paramountcy principle in section 1(1) of the Children Act.
Although this analysis of the differences in reasoning between the CA and the ECHR is largely correct, it is now critical in the HRA legal context to question the assumptions behind it with a view to introducing modifications to the utilitarian model. The CA, since it identifies the welfare of the child as the sole and decisive consideration, does not correspond to classic utilitarianism: it does not seek to arrive at an outcome which, overall, achieves the best result for the family members or others, but only for the child. In other words, it only requires that the child’s welfare should be paramount, rather than by direct reference to the principle of utility whereby actions that maximise the greatest welfare of the greatest number are preferentially singled out (Herring 1999b pp223-35). Thus any decision made on an individual’s application under the CA will not be justified by reference to the principle of utility. In short, the paramountcy principle is not a welfarist principle as has been argued in many contexts.
At the same time it may be pointed out that the HRA’s approach cannot be said to be fully rights-based. Although the Convention is clearly a classically or rights-based document since it assumes that certain rights and interests are intrinsically valuable and should prima facie be protected, its adherence to a strictly rights approach may be viewed as undermined in respect of the materially qualified articles such as articles 8-11. Mullender (2000) has argued that these articles are a species of a qualified rights-based approach, since the qualifications of their second paragraphs allow the rights to be compromised or overridden by sufficiently weighty consequential consideration (Mullender 2000, pp 493-516). Thus, although the Convention’s theoretical underpinnings differ significantly from those of the CA, the differences in their approaches and values may be less irreconcilable than some theorists have cared to acknowledge.
However, demonstrating that the approaches between the paramountcy principle and the HRA are not all that much at odds does not resolve the issue. This is because as it is currently conceived and applied, the paramountcy principle is incompatible with the demands of article 8 of the Convention. There is, therefore, a need for a reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle under section 3(1) of the HRA in accordance with the interpretative obligation under that section, and of the need for taking account of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence under section 2.
The term ‘paramount’ in section 1(1) of the CA needs to be redefined, but such redefinition need not be radical because the word ‘paramount’ also suggests the notion of ‘pre-eminency’, rather than the meaning the courts have so far given it under the Children Act, whereby it has in reality meant ‘sole’. However, given the scope for ambiguity that the courts might discover in the term ‘pre-eminent’, the term ‘primacy’ might be more in line with the HRA’s provisions as well as the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg institutions. The adoption of that term could be viewed as a possible interpretation of the term ‘paramount’ and would obviate the need for a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA. This rendering of the paramountcy principle is also in line with article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires that in all actions concerning children, their best interests must be a primary consideration. The use of the article ‘a’ in the Convention suggests that the welfare or best interests of the child are to be considered, but that a number of other factors can also be considered (Alston 1994b). Clearly, these factors include the rights of other individuals and institutions who constitute the child’s social world.
Framework for mediating parents’ and children’s interests
As was demonstrated above, the HRA does allow the consideration of children’s rights alongside those of others, according no presumptive paramountcy to any. It is therefore necessary to accord a mechanism which allows a proper balancing of these interests. In this regard, it should be noted that the contemporaneous analysis of -which involves the dual exercise of proportionality-has already found domestic judicial and academic favour in the context of conflicts between articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. Outside the domain of child welfare, the presumption in favour of equality of Convention rights is now well-established. In this regard, the decision in Re S [2004] WL 62115 is of special significance since it concerned the right of a child to private life. In Re S the Court of Appeal sought to weigh up articles 8 and 10 against each other in a matter in which, although clearly dealing with the welfare of the child, the Court held that the paramountcy principle did not to apply. In that case, the Court found, in a highly significant break with the previous line of authority, that children’s rights and the rights of others must be construed as independent elements, on the basis, following Douglas v Hello! [2001] QB 967 1005 at para 24; and A v B plc [2003] 3 WLR 542 at para 6;1 that one does not have pre-eminence over the other. In the lower court it had been assumed that press freedom would be afforded primacy and that the article 8 rights of the child would figure merely as exceptions under article 10(2). It was accepted that this was clearly the wrong approach. Lady Justice Hale then went on to consider the proportionality of the proposed interference with freedom of expression before proceeding to consider the matter from the perspective of the child’s article 8 rights, media freedom figuring this time as an exception to them under article 8(2). In considering the proportionality of the proposed interference with the right of the child to respect for his private and family life, the judge had to take account of the magnitude of the interference proposed. Lady Justice Hale came to the conclusion that since the first instance judge had not considered each article independently, and so had not conducted the difficult balancing exercise required by the Convention, the appeal should be allowed, in order that the exercise could be properly carried out by the first instance Family Division court.
The majority judges endorsed Lady Hale’s analysis, which was then applied in the lower courts; it was subsequently endorsed by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. In that instance Lord Hope and Baroness Hale in the majority conducted a balancing exercise between the article 8 and 10 rights in question on a basis of their presumptive equality. In Re S (a child) 2004 [2004] UKHL 47 itself the House of Lords also endorsed the use of the contemporaneous analysis. (The question of paramountcy was not addressed since it had been accepted by both sides that the principle was inapplicable.) Referring to the contemporaneous analysis, Lord Steyn found that in clashes between the Convention rights: ‘the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test’ (at para 17). Since this analysis has been endorsed in two decisions of the House of Lords it is now clear that it must be viewed as the correct approach to all clashes of the qualified Convention rights, including, it is argued, clashes between two or more rights-holders claiming the same right such as family law disputes involving children, their parents and other parties
Consequently, since in Re S, both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, took as its starting point the presumptive equality of articles 8 and 10, and relied on paragraph 2 of each article in order to resolve the conflict between them, it is an extremely significant decision since it creates a new model for judicial reasoning. It is therefore submitted that the reasoning developed in that case should also be used in instances in which the paramountcy principle comes into play under the CA. As indicated above, the application of Convention rights under the HRA and in particular, the consideration of article 8 would necessitate, as indicated above and in line with the ‘ultimate balancing test’ in Re S and the other cases quoted above, the reconfiguration of that principle as one of primacy. Further, it is argued that if the presumptive equality approach is the right one in relation to conflicts between articles 8 and 10, it surely follows that this approach should be adopted to resolve clashes between differing article 8 rights to respect for family life.
Following this reasoning model, a child’s article 8 right cannot figure merely as an exception to the parent’s right, and vice versa. Still less can the parent’s right be almost entirely abrogated-as the paramountcy principle currently demands-without a full application of the paragraph 2 tests. Following this argument, in line with the reasoning in Re S model, the rights of all parties should be considered in turn, the rights of others figuring in each instance as exceptions to the article 8(1) right in question, applying all the tests within article 8(2) in each instance. Each analysis would therefore parallel the other ones. This is clearly a parallel exercise in proportionality and will be repeated to take into account the claims of each of the parties involved. In conducting this reasoning process-the ultimate balancing act as Lord Steyn termed it-it would be important to examine the underlying values at stake in any particular instance. The question of underlying harmony between the asserted claims can most appropriately be considered in relation to the exercise of proportionality.
The approach detailed above does not subordinate any parties interests by the application of an overarching principle is fairer and therefore yields more contextualised decisions which take into account the interests of all parties involved. It is therefore submitted that there is a framework for mediating parents’ and children’s interests under the HRA and that such framework is more equitable than that which prevailed in the pre-HRA era.
Concluding remarks
The legal framework through which parents’ and children’s rights were mediated in the pre-HRA era, namely through the operation of the paramountcy principle in the CA is no longer tenable after the implementation of the HRA. It is no longer fair in a rights-based framework to presumptively hold one party’s rights as being always paramount. In this regard, the HRA framework resolves clashes of interests between parents and their children by providing for a framework which promotes the presumptive equality of the rights of each right holder. If their rights clash, then a fair proportionality test is carried out to decide which rights-holder’s entitlements should be scaled back. In this way, the HRA does provide a framework in which the rights and interests of both parents and children are protected.
Endnotes
1Lady Justice Hale (as she then was), who gave the leading judgement, relied on Lord Woolf’s dicta in A v B to the effect that ‘[the court must] attach proper weight to the important rights which both articles are designed to protect. Each article is qualified expressly in a way which allows the interests under the other article to be taken into account’
Bibliography
International Conventions
Convention on the Rights of the Child
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950
Statutes
Children Act 1989
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925
Human Rights Act 1998
Cases
A V C [1985] FLR 445
A v United Kingdom (Human Rights: Punishment of Child) [1998] 2 FLR 959
Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293
Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22
Douglas v Hello! [2001] QB 967 1005
Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342
Kroon v Netherlands (1994) 17 EHRR 263
L v Sweden Application 10141/82 40 D&R 140
Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175
Olsson v Sweden (No 2)((1994) 17 EHRR 134
R v UK; W v UK; B v UK; Judgments and Decisions of the European Court, vol 121 (1987).
R v United Kingdom [1988] 2 FLR 445
Re Agar-Ellis Re Agar-Ellis (1883) 24 Ch D 317
Re KD (A Minor) (Wardship: Termination of Access) [1970] AC 668
Re P (Contact: Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314
Re S [2004] WL 62115
Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] 2 WLR 556
X v Denmark (1978) Application 6854/78 7-9 D&R 81
X v Netherlands (1974) Application 6753/74 1-3 D&R 118
Books and articles
Alston, P & Gilmour-Walsh, B The best interests of the child: Towards a synthesis rights and cultural values, Florence: Innocenti Studies, 1996.
Alston, P (ed), The best interests of the child: Reconciling culture and human rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994a.
Alston, P ‘The best interests principle: Towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights’ in Alston, P (ed), The best interests of the child: Reconciling culture and human rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994b.
Bainham, A Children: The modern law, Bristol: Jor
Related child law essays
Please note: The above essays and dissertations were written by students and then submitted to us to display and help others. Thanks to all the students who have submitted their work to us.
Back to Free Law Essays
