"There can be no legal definition of the term 'relevance'; relevance must be assessed according to logic and the common course of events." Discuss

The actual concept of relevance is easy to grasp, it simply refers to any item of proof that renders the existence of a fact in a case that has been put the court more probable or less probable.

Difficulties arise in how relevance should actually be assessed. This essay will discuss how various commentators and Judges say that relevance should be assessed, by looking at the definitions that they have put forward and therefore discussed, and also how in practice relevance has actually been assessed by the courts in various cases that have arisen.

Relevance denotes a relationship such that one fact has some bearing on another fact; and there are varying definitions that have been put forward as to what the term relevance means. Although these definitions do differ slightly they all are similar in that they promote the idea that relevance must be assessed according to logic and the common course or events.

Over the years there have been many definitions of relevance and how it should be assessed put forward by various authors and Judges, and these all have the same concurrent theme that relevance should be assessed according to logic and the common course of events.

Stephen’s put forward the classic definition of the logic of relevance in 1948:

‘any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the other.’

This early definition incorporated many important elements of the concept of relevance. His definition was important because it showed that by using logic, even if a piece of evidence was not relevant in one context, it might be relevant in another. For example a person may say that the moon is made of cheese, which will be held irrelevant due to the scientific discoveries regarding the composition of the moon, but it may be relevant in showing that the person has the power of speech, or that they can speak English.

In the early twentieth century Thayer restated Stephen’s definition. He said that:

‘the law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logic and general experience – assuming that the principles of reasoning are known to Judges and Ministers, just as a vast multitude of other things are assumed as already sufficiently known to them…’
This definition of how relevance should be assessed elaborates on Stephen’s definition very well, and clearly states how assessing relevance should be approached. From Thayer’s definition it shows that relevance is an application of logical enquiry, and he goes on to say that ‘there is not so much a rule of evidence as a proposition…which forbids anything irrelevant, not logically probative.’

Thayer’s work on relevance is important, as he insists that logic and common sense reasoning should be the standards by which relevance of evidence should be assessed. This definition has had a lot of influence in the assessment of relevance, and has led to the concept of relevance being understood as one that incorporates the important elements of logic and the common course of events.

Following on from academic definitions of relevance, the common law has sought to explain and perhaps illustrate how relevance must be assessed.

In the case of Kearley (1992), Lord Oliver explained relevance in the following terms: ‘any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non existence of the other.’ This explanation of relevance clearly draws similarities with Stephen’s definition, and shows how the law has developed over the years, to a traditional, maybe even universal, definition of what relevance is and how it should be assessed to achieve a satisfactory result.

In a case preceding this, DPP v Kilbourne (1973), Lord Simon of Glaisdale said that ‘evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof.’ This precedent clearly shows that evidence that is put before the court, needs to have some kind of logical relationship between the evidence and the fact that is trying to be proved. Therefore the evidence needs to increase or decrease the probability of the evidence of the fact that is in issue.

There are different types of evidence that demonstrate that relevance should be assessed according to logic and the common course of events. For example a strong motive for an offence tends to show that it is more likely the offence was committed by that particular person, whereas a lack of motive for an offence tends to show that it is unlikely that the offence was committed by someone with no motive. Also if someone was present at the time of an offence being committed, it is more than likely that they commissioned the offence rather than someone who was not held to be present at the time of the offence. Looking at these scenarios, it would seem likely that based on logic and the common course of events, the court would assess the evidence to be relevant.

Lord Simon of Glaisdale also went onto say that he would not actually analyse what is involved in ‘logically probativeness’ but he says how important the element of experience is. It would seem that looking at the current case law within the area of relevance, that experience is a key factor when assessing logically whether evidence is relevant, to the facts in issue, in the case or not. It can be seen that experience is important when using logic, as it will help to determine relevance by looking at similar cases and situations, and consequentially the common course of events.

It is clear by past definitions of relevance, and subsequently how it should be assessed, that have been put forward, that the question of relevance is governed by logic and the common course of events, and that courts work on the assumption that facts can only be established by evidence which has a logical tendency to prove it.

A problem with assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events, rather than having a standard legal definition of relevance, is that whose logic is actually being portrayed, and what is understood to be the common course of events. It can be seen from the case law that has accumulated over the years, that the assessment of relevance according to logic and the common course of events is decided by the judge who is trying the case in hand. A problem with this is that it may lead to problems of stereotyping, particularly to do with gender, sexuality and race issues.

In R v Lydon (1987) it was decided that relevance has to be assessed in the context of the party’s case as a whole. Therefore the court needs to look at all the issues surrounding the evidence that is in question, and not just a specific area of the case that may prejudice the outcome.

Another problem with assessing relevance according to logic, apart from the issue of whom is actually using their logic to assess the relevance of the evidence before them, but what is actually understood to be meant by the term logic. A problem therefore exists with what does logic actually mean, and how different people may apply it to a given set of facts and evidence. This issue has been created by the development of the definition regarding the assessment of relevance using logic. Wigmore promoted ‘legal relevance’ as a technical judicial concept extending beyond the ordinary meaning of logic, common sense relevance. Wigmore’s view is that relevance is a two-dimensional concept. The first stage being that the judge should determine a logical relationship to an issue in the trial, and then the judge must additionally satisfy himself that the evidence is sufficiently probative in light of the other evidence of the case.

It seems that due to the view of many commentators, including Wigmore, that the first hurdle of whether a piece of evidence is relevant or not, is satisfied only by evidence with a ‘plus value over’ and above logical relevance.

It may be assumed that judges think logically, but what may be interpreted in a logical manner by one judge, may be assessed differently by a different judge. So although relevance is ‘apparently’ assessed logically, in essence two judges could arrive at different conclusions regarding relevance of a piece of evidence in a case.

Following on from the problems discussed above is that a controversial problem has arisen when assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events, which is that in the past judges have arrived at the decision that evidence is actually ‘irrelevant’ and actually as no relevance to the case at all. This is a very black and white approach to assessing relevance. For example there may be evidence that is relevant in some sense, but it is maybe more nuisance that it is worth, because there is not additional evidence to support it or the evidence may support more than one conclusion. In situations like this, the court will not allow the jury to hear a particular piece or evidence. Is this assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events, or is it simply a situation where it is easy for the court to exclude evidence, rather than assess how it maybe actually be relevant, and therefore have some bearing on a case.

In the case of R v Blastland (1986) the court controversially labelled such evidence as ‘irrelevant.’ The defendant contended that he did not commit the murder but that someone else known to him did. This person being ‘Mark.’ There was some evidence available that that showed that Mark had detailed knowledge about the murder before it had become public knowledge. Even though this evidence perhaps showed the involvement of Mark at some level, the House of Lords said that there was no evidence as to how Mark might have actually acquired this knowledge. It could have been by watching Blastland carry out the murder, or by doing it himself. They therefore decided that the evidence was irrelevant to Blastland’s defence. Even though there was a chance that Mark had carried out the murder, the House of Lords said it was irrelevant that he knew about it, because they did not know how he knew.

The House of Lord’s decision here came to the ‘logic’ conclusion that Mark could have come by his knowledge about the murder in a number of ways that could be innocent or only partly incriminating. Therefore due to this evidence ultimately being unnecessarily complicating and ultimately inconclusive, the evidence was kept from the jury.

This decision of the House of Lord’s was held to be controversial because most people can grasp the logic of there being some relevance to Blastland’s case, of this evidence being available. Therefore one would want to know more about Mark’s involvement in the murder, because clearly if he was involved then it weakens the case against Blastland being the murder, or at least being solely responsible for what happened. This being the case, it would seem that the evidence is clearly relevant in the face of logic.

This decision is a troubling one, because it leaves the impression that Mark’s evidence should have been admitted. In the court not doing so, perhaps leads to injustice and maybe not even a fair trial for Blastland. This opens us up the suggestion that perhaps relevance should not be assessed according to the common course of events, and logic in particular, and that the current law may benefit from a statutory legal definition of relevance, and how it should be assessed by the courts. If this were to happen, it could avoid situations like that in Blastland, which clearly show an unsatisfactory approach to assessing relevance, from happening again.

Although the outcome of Blastland seems unsatisfactory, it is still expressed by many that it is important that Judges are allowed to assess relevance according to logic and the common course of events, because each case that becomes before a Judge is very different to the next, and the last, which will present very different evidence before a court.

It can be argued that logic and the common course of events are not the only things to be used when assessing relevance, for example experience as discussed above. Although looking at the case of Blastland, it seems that none of these elements were used to assess relevance, which therefore makes it difficult to show that logic and the common course of events, let alone other factors that may confuse the assessment process. Although Lord Simon of Glaisdale says that experience is a key factor when using logic to assess relevance, this does not seem to be the case in Blastland.

The decisions that have been made on the relevance of evidence over the years can perhaps be seen as contradictory, and as can be seen from above, in these cases Judges have sought to provide some guidance on how relevance should actually be assessed. Therefore due to these decisions sometimes being unsatisfactory (particularly that of Blastland,) the guidance can create confusion for future cases of what is exactly meant by relevant evidence, and how it should be assessed consistently and effectively.

In certain areas of the law where evidence has to be assessed according to its relevance, there have been attempts at producing guidelines to try and direct judges when assessing this evidence, and also when directing juries regarding such evidence. The Judicial Studies Board issued a Specimen Direction (No 36) to help with this area of the law. Following this direction the leading authority that arose in this area was Guney (1998). The relevance of the evidence in this case had to be assessed by using logic and looking at the common course of events. The evidence concerned here was evidence that could be prejudicial to the case because it showed the commission of other offences, and not ones that the defendant had been charged for in the current proceedings. Therefore using logic and the common course of events the judge held this evidence to be inadmissible, even though it may have been relevant in some sense, due to the fact that the evidence related to the offences in question was related to the issues involved in this case. It was shown in this case that it is ‘dangerous artificially to separate’ the issues involved. It was held that in all cases the question whether evidence is relevant depends not on ‘abstract legal theory but on the individual circumstances of each particular case.’

This is a clear example of the courts applying logic and looking at the common course of events in a case. This shows that assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events is a useful doctrine, which has been used widely over the years, and will no doubt continue to be common practice. This shows that perhaps there is a reason why there is no actual legal definition of how to assess relevance, because it is best to look at the relevance of evidence in a case according to logic whilst also considering the common course of events.

Although there are problems assessing relevance using logic and the common course of events, as can be seen from the discussion above, where it can allow issues like prejudice to arise in a case, it would seem that having a legal definition of relevance that has to be strictly adhered to would also create problems such as prejudice. For example, if evidence was classed as relevant, due to there not being any scope to use logic to render it inadmissible if necessary, then evidence may be put forward that is not actually beneficial to a case, and may actually do more harm than good. It can be argued that situations will arise where if relevance is assessed according to logic and the common course of events, that evidence may sensibly not be allowed to be put forward to a jury.

It is clearly illustrated in the case of Guney, how well assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events works, which shows us that at present the law regarding relevance and how it should be assessed is satisfactory and perhaps as good as it can be.

There are many types of evidence such as lifestyle evidence, previous convictions and past relationships that if introduced into a trial, would be prejudicial to the outcome of that trial, creating unfairness. It therefore seems important for Judges to be allowed to assess relevance according to logic and the common course of events, so that they can depending on the circumstances of a case, decide how it is best to proceed in order to create fairness and consistency.

In all areas of the law, there will be cases that will be seen as being conducted unfairly and perhaps wrongly, as in the case of Blastland. But are these cases enough to warrant a change in the law. There is much commentary on how relevance should be assessed according to logic and the common course of events, and it seems to be if not a fundamental principle of the law, but perhaps a traditional one that allows Judges to use their discretion as they see fit. If there were a statutory definition of how to assess relevance, there would no doubt be problems that arise with the application of that. One the whole many commentators seem to support the idea of assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events, and it would perhaps be too difficult to create a rule of how relevance should be assessed.

Although it seems that as a whole assessing relevance according to logic and the common course of events is satisfactory, it would perhaps be helpful for there to be some guidelines published regarding how relevance should be assessed, so that consistency within the law is achieved, and anomalies like that of the case of Blastland are not created.

Bibliography

1. Munday, R (2003) Evidence. 2nd Edition. Lexis Nexis. London.

2. Murphy, P (….) Murphy on Evidence. Blackstone Press. London.

3. Reay, R. (2003) Evidence. 4th Edition. Old Bailey Press. London.

4. Roberts, P. & Zuckerman, A. (2004) Criminal Evidence. Oxford University Press. Oxford

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