How would you define democracy?

In the contemporary terrorism-ridden political climate, where the threat of attacks upon our fundamental freedoms are as devastating as they are ubiquitous, the notion of democracy is propounded as both the catalyst of such attacks and the panacea to them. Indeed, the power of the democratic ideal has pervaded legal and political discourse throughout the last century, evoking “some of histories most profound and moving expressions of human will and intellect ”. Yet despite its ubiquity and centrality, little is known about democracy with sufficient empirical or theoretical certainty , and a comprehensive definition has eluded both lawyers and political scientists. As such, the democratic ideal has been deemed an “essentially contested concept ”: one which is “sufficiently complex and open-textured to sustain multiple reasonable interpretations ”.

With these issues in mind, the conceptual parameters of this essay can be considered. This paper will attempt to elucidate the definitional confusion which has pervaded the concept of democracy. It will review the traditional approach to the democratic concept, which perceives democracy as purely a procedural method of “determining who is to govern ”, and in partially rejecting this reading as overly narrow and mechanical, will posit a complementary definition, focusing upon a more substantive interpretation, consonant with the contemporary use of the term.

Although intuitively considered a recent political development, and in existence only sporadically over the last two centuries, the genesis of the concept of democracy is considerably older, with its roots in Athenian culture of ancient Greece . A response to centuries of oligarchic and plutocratic rule, the institution of a predominantly democratic governance was architected by Solon, and his successor Kleisthenes, as a method of promoting prosperity for all. Compliant with the etymological roots of the term democracy: the words demos (people), and kratein (to rule), the Athenian democratic concept was grounded in the notion of a state “ruled by the people” . Affirmed through the writings of authors from Aristotle to Cicero, and politicians from Jefferson to Lincoln, the Athenian approach to democracy as a government “of the people, by the people, and for people” has endured into contemporary scholarly discourse.
Yet despite the presumed clarity of defining democracy as “rule by the people”, it is axiomatic that a simple etymological approach to the definition of democracy is fundamentally insufficient. As Birch acknowledges:

“We cannot arrive at an objective and precise definition of democracy simply by elucidating the intrinsic meaning of the term ”.

Birch recognises that however cogent the notion of ‘rule by the people’ was during burgeoning attempts at Athenian democracy, its contemporary application is more problematic because both ‘rule’ and ‘people’ are definitionally ambiguous. Such ambiguity is saliently observed by Jack Lively:

“What constitutes ‘rule’ and what ‘people’? Does ‘the people’ imply some homogenous will amongst all members of a community? Is that possible? ….As to the word ‘rule’ it could be said in any strict sense that many cannot rule, while...in any loose sense than many may rule ”.

To combat such ambiguity, the orthodox approach to defining democracy lies in observing “the political practice and common usage, which leads to a definition in terms of institutions and processes ”. This empirical approach to democracy perceives it as “the freedom of self-determination in making collective and binding decisions…citizens entitled to participate as political equals in making the laws and rules under which they will live as citizens ”. This definition, propounded by prominent democratic theorist Robert Dahl, reveals the fundamentally procedural nature of traditional approaches to democracy, whereby its existence in any state is characterised by some institutional political arrangement. Simply put, democracy in this sense is indeed ‘merely a way of choosing government’. Broadly speaking, this procedural interpretation is predominantly composed of two distinct ‘core’ processes: political participation and political ‘contestation’.

First, the notion of political participation: the idea that “people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them ” through an electoral process, is perhaps the most widely accepted component of democracy. Originally, through the writings of Aristotle, the concept of political participation connoted ‘direct democracy’ in which “all citizens, without the intermediary of elected officials, participate in making public decisions ”. It retained this Aristotelian association with direct democracy until the late eighteenth century, when the post-classical Western world adopted ‘representative democracy’ as its new paradigm: whereby citizens elect officials to make political decisions in their name. In this sense, the notion of democracy is aligned with political equality and the ‘majority principle’, whereby “each person should have one vote, and each person’s vote should be accorded the same formal weight as every other ”, so that ultimately, “the will of the majority of qualified citizens rules ”.
As a corollary, democracy is simply an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote ”. Although it will be contended below that this interpretation of democracy is somewhat reductivist, it is this notion of ‘representative democracy’, and the ancillary concept of majoritarianism, which now lies at the “core” of any democratic system .

The second process, that of political contestation, complements electoralism by ensuring that the procedural model of democracy is not limited to “the ability to select once every four years from among pre-packaged candidates ”, but instead equally signifies “open expression of opposition and distrust of government ”. This component of democracy, posited by Robert Dahl, mitigates the ‘fallacy of electoralism’ - the idea, considered below, that minorities are always denied a sufficient say in the democratic electoral process – by ensuring that all citizens have the power to determine or affect governmental policies outside the electoral window, through “the activities of pressure groups, acting on governments, legislatures or public opinion to advance their own goals ”. According to Aneta Wierzynska, this, “more complete understanding of democracy”, reveals that it is, in part, “based on the open expression of a healthy suspicion of power”, and incorporates a web of “checks and balances ensuring that power is not monopolised in any one locus ”.

As indicated, this procedural approach to democracy comports entirely with common interpretations of the term, which emphasise the need for compliance with formal democratic requirements. Yet perceiving democracy as purely a formal method of selecting government, however accurate from an etymological and procedural perspective, is at best paradoxical, and at worst fundamentally flawed.

First, as regards the paradox of procedural democracy, such an argument is grounded in the notion that, although democracy is intended to be enjoyed by all, the very notion of majoritarianism guarantees that “non-one determines a decision who has voted against it ”. Thus through the ‘tyranny of the majority’, majoritarian models of democracy, which putatively strive for equality, fail to provide such equality for losing minorities, and therefore may not adequately protect minority groups.
Second, a purely procedural focus to democracy would also provide a veil of democratic legitimacy to authoritarian regimes, who can attract the label democracy simply by implementing procedures for elections, but without the more substantive goals attendant to such status . Indeed, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide affirmed this idea, observing that “the forces of order wanted us to vote so that it would appear to the outside world that we were a happy, peaceful democracy, and then the exploitation and corruption could go on as before ”

As regards the inherent flaws in the logic of the procedural model of democracy, such inconsistencies are fourfold. First, if one proceeds from the proposition that democracy is pure majority rule, then the process of judicial review, where unelected judges invalidate actions of elected bodies, and a process prevalent in many liberal democracies, is at odds with that definition ”. Second, a purely procedural model of democracy also provides little in the way of normative assessments of the outcomes of procedures because it only “lists the institutional requisites without revealing the underlying logic of ends that generates the list ”. Third, Brad Roth asserts that the electoral-based model of democracy actually fails to satisfy the basic requirements of democracy:-

“participation (in elections) scarcely implies the rudiments of accountability….to reject one given set of administrators of the social order in favour of another…is very far from genuine democracy. ”

Lastly, and perhaps most crucially, the contemporary pre-occupation with a purely procedural model of democracy obscures “more far-reaching objectives such as enhancing respect for human rights ”. The exclusive reliance upon electoral processes in particular, is “inadequately attentive to such issues as structural inequality, social justice and human rights ”’. This, in turn, has pernicious consequences for democratic ideal as a whole because it renders irrelevant the “impact of social conditions on opportunities for political participation ”, which as a corollary further entrenches the status quo by undermining citizen empowerment.

As such, the central contention of this paper is that a purely procedural conception of democracy is untenable, because such a conceptualisation isolates the method of democratic regimes, and departs from equally fundamental substantive implications of democracy. A less technocratic and formalistic conception recognises that democracy is both a means and an end. Rather than perceiving democracy as purely a set of constitutional rules and procedures that determine how government functions, the substantive conception perceives democracy as equally concerned with a society premised upon freedom as the institutional arrangements by which that society is constituted. This distinction is crucial, and is perhaps most evident in the work of John Hart Ely whose work inheres a horizontal view of democracy in context, underscored by a larger view of democratic culture, the idea of a democratic society, not merely a democratic polity . Under this alternative interpretation, which dissents from the premise that democracy presumptively implies majoritarianism, and instead expounds a more multi-dimensional understanding, emphasis is placed upon the effects of democratic procedure: the recognition that democracy institutionalises certain fundamental tenets of civil society including liberty, equality and citizenship. As Edward Rubin recognises:

“Democracy is not merely a descriptive term, it also possesses powerful normative associations…. to the extent that ‘democratic’ is virtually a synonym for good or desirable ”.
These embedded associations are grounded in the idea that a democratic form of government represents freedom , and a “broad democratic notion of social enfranchisement, a notion that goes beyond elections and formal political processes ”. Perhaps the pre-eminent exponent of this substantive view is Tocqueville whose work eschews a narrowly electoral focus , and in associating democracy with a moral imperative, equates it with a form of political liberalism focused upon civil society and a defining emphasis on equality.
Although this substantive approach has been pejoratively labelled ‘idealist’, it undoubtedly ameliorates some of the conceptual flaws in the purely procedural model outlined above. For instance, the danger than states will hide authoritarian regimes under the veil of democracy undoubtedly benefits from the substantive approach because although procedural democratic models are intended to ensure legitimate government, such procedures “now confer and measure such legitimacy ”, and therefore would benefit from the idea that legitimate democratic government can only be measured by the impact of such processes upon civil society. Similarly, the concern that majoritarianism inherently prejudices minority groups is mitigated by the multi-dimensional approach, because whilst the procedural model tolerates such bias , if the goals of democracy are substantive, minority groups may participate in, and benefit from, democracy in a range of settings, not merely electoral.
It is notable however, that the broader, more multi-dimensional definition of democracy posited here, has not received universal approval. In particular, theorist Adam Przeworski rejects the substantive interpretation in favour of what may be called ‘democratic minimalism’, arguing that democracy cannot always deliver normatively desirable ideas such as justice, freedom and equality, and should be read only “as a system in which officials are chosen at regular elections ”. Moreover, Joseph Schumpter, perhaps the leading exponent of democratic models, affirms ‘democratic minimalism’ arguing that democratic theory is satisfied by competitive elections, because “that is all that can be expected ”. In this sense, “democracy’s essence is a process, not a set of substantive goals: a means, not an end ”, and any attempts at a more substantive reading is dismissed as quixotic, grounded in the fallacious presumption that some universal consensus exists as to just or fair outcomes , and that democracies are inherently capable of producing them.

Given the innumerable flaws in the purely procedural model and the potential for ideological and pragmatic flaws with the substantive form, it is contended that the most preferable definition of democracy lies in the fusion of the two. As such, an intermediate model may be proposed which may be termed ‘democracy as accountability’. Under this approach, strong focus is placed upon notions of political accountability to citizens, by perceiving democracy as a method of requiring leaders to bear the consequences of their decisions and thereby fostering decision making more responsive to society’s needs . According to certain theorists, the concept of accountability forms the basis of a functional definition of democracy , because it vests ultimate power, the power to sanction decision-makers, with citizens. By defining democracy in terms of accountability, the formal requirements of the procedural model are met, through periodic elections, but because the ultimate focus is upon the goals of democracy, does not allow them to be circumvented through an overt focus on procedure. At the same time, whilst this definition focuses upon the substantive impact of democracy- the satisfaction of citizens- it allows citizens to determine the substantive content of their own democracy , without an abstract, and quixotic articulation of the ‘just’ ends to be achieved.

To conclude, despite the ubiquity of the term democracy in contemporary legal, political and social culture, the precise conceptual contours of the notion of democracy are greatly contested. Through an examination of the etymological and historical roots of the concept, and the view that democracy is a government ‘ruled by the people’, the term is most commonly used “to describe a particular distribution of power within the community ”. In crystallising such an inherently abstract definition, the post-classical world came to understand democracy purely as an electoral concept, conferring upon every citizen to power to affect government policy, and hold politicians accountable when the majority will of the nation was not upheld. Yet this paper has contended that such a limited, procedural approach, even when supplemented with political contestation, is entirely insufficient to comport with the increasingly substantive nature of contemporary democracy. As commonly understood, political theory now mandates that the democratic process institutionalises just or fair outcomes, and that by understanding democracy as accountability, decision-makers bear the consequences of their decisions. Only through this, broader understanding of democracy, can the inherent flaws of the reductivist procedural model be surmounted, permitting democracy to be perceived less as purely a method of selecting civil government, and more as a method of producing civil society.

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